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Abstract
In this paper, the authors address the ad hoc and politicised 
manner in which people come to be appointed to the boards of 
public bodies in Ireland. Some of the problems of this system 
with arguments for more meritocracy, transparency and 
Papers July 2011
are described. Alternative models for more transparent and
independent public appointments are presented, along 
diversity in public appointments. These provide a range of 
options for improving the current appointments process. 
The authors argue that the current ad hoc process needs  
or mix of models is formally adopted.
to be replaced with clear rules - regardless of which model 
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“To the victor the spoils of political office. But some of the appointments made by 
governments – present and past – to State boards and agencies have illustrated 
the clear defects of that spoils system. In some cases the political affiliation of 
those appointed has mattered more than their suitability or their professional 
qualification for a board position. All parties in government have engaged in the 
practice, particularly at the end of their tenure. And all parties in opposition have 
railed against it, while promising to reform the system in government. But the 
record speaks for itself.” 
Irish Times, Editorial, Friday, 21 January 2011 
 
Introduction: background and context 
1. The lack of accountability and oversight of ministerial appointments to public 
bodies is a pressing concern that should be prioritised for reform. Since the 
early 1990s public bodies have ceased to be merely an adjunct to the work of 
Government, traditionally conducted by the central civil service. Instead, they 
have become central to the Irish system of government, performing vital 
public functions, controlling significant expenditure and employing large 
numbers of public sector workers. They play a crucial role in delivering 
services ranging from education, health and immigration, to food safety, 
public enterprise and road safety. The changed importance of public bodies 
needs to be reflected in an improved and more consistent process for making 
appointments to the boards that govern them. 
2. As TASC demonstrated in its 2006 publication Outsourcing Government: 
Public Bodies and Accountability, many of our public bodies have developed 
in an ad hoc manner, many of which are governed by boards of directors 
appointed in a similarly ad hoc manner. Public mistrust of this essentially 
politicised approach to the governance of significant elements of Irish public 
administration is compounded by the lack of transparency in the way boards 
of public bodies are appointed. Sporadic negative media and political 
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commentary, together with political initiatives by TDs of different political 
persuasions, suggests that there is a growing consensus surrounding the 
need for reform. In April 2011, the cabinet approved a memorandum from 
Minister for Public Expenditure Brendan Howlin proposing that vacancies on 
State boards should in future be advertised on the website of the relevant 
Government department; this suggests that the issue of public appointments 
is a priority for the new Government. 
3. TASC’s 2010 report, Mapping the Golden Circle, highlighted risks to good 
corporate governance in some of Ireland’s most economically important 
State-owned bodies. Recent history has also shown the danger of relying 
solely on the expertise of those who control the decision-making structures 
in this country, whether these are members of the business elite, top-ranking 
civil and public servants or leading members of the legal and accountancy 
professions. We argue that Ireland needs to adopt a model of public 
appointments to ensure that appointments to public boards are transparent, 
and that those appointed are qualified to oversee delivery of the services 
within a board’s remit. In addition, board appointees should also reflect the 
diversity of modern Ireland; for example in terms of ethnicity. This is essential 
to avoid ‘groupthink’ and to strengthen the protection of the public interest, 
as a guiding principle in how public bodies are governed. 
4. This paper is designed to stimulate a wider public debate about the 
importance of improving the governance of public bodies. International 
experience and commentary suggests that there are advances in this area 
that Ireland could draw from. For example, the OECD stated that “If boards 
[in Ireland] are to be maintained as effective governing bodies, board 
nomination needs to be treated as a human resource management issue and 
capacity should be dedicated to improving the nomination process and 
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searching for the right profiles”.3 This paper examines three potential models 
for reforming the appointments process, based on experience in other 
jurisdictions with legal and administrative backgrounds similar to Ireland’s, 
including Canada, New Zealand, Scotland and the rest of the UK. Each of 
these jurisdictions has undertaken fundamental and effective reforms from 
which Ireland can learn. These reforms include moves towards reducing 
discretionary ministerial powers. New legislation has been enacted and new 
oversight institutions established. Public scrutiny of the appointments 
process has been facilitated by publicising codes of practice, protocols, 
processes and appointment decisions. And, in an even stronger move 
towards independent appointments, Nova Scotia in Canada has granted 
legislative committees the power of veto over ministerial appointments. 
5. One study has helpfully distinguished between different degrees of reform in 
appointment processes to public sector boards.4  
(A) Model A maintains the role of the minister in making appointments and 
relies on parliamentary committees or similar bodies for oversight. It also 
includes appointment protocols and codes of practice, the publication of 
selection criteria and potential conflicts of interest, and advertising 
available positions widely.  
(B) Model B – essentially the UK model – develops the first approach by 
concentrating on the establishment of a central oversight body (an 
agency or parliamentary committee) to scrutinise processes and 
appointments. It is helpful to note that, despite widespread 
                                                          
3
 Management Review of Ireland, ‘Towards an Integrated Public Service’, OECD Public Management 
Reviews (2008) p. 305 
4
 This typology was developed for comparative purposes in order to develop reform models for Australia. 
See: Edwards, Meredith (July, 2006) ‘Appointments to Public Sector Boards in Australia: A Comparative 
Assessment, Issues Paper Series No.3, University of Canberra, Australia Corporate Governance ARC 
Project. Due to this study’s focus on ‘Anglo-Saxon’ governance systems, including the UK, it may be 
reasonably applied to Ireland. 
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acknowledgement that an innovative system has been established in 
which an independent body (the OCPA) plays a central role and despite 
this being a significant improvement on previous systems, there have 
been calls in the UK for further changes to be made and for responsibility 
for appointments to be transferred to the UK Commissioner for Public 
Appointments.5 
(C) The third approach (Model C) strengthens Model B by establishing an 
independent statutory central authority which manages the appointment 
process from start to finish. For example, the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments in Scotland has more independence than the UK 
Commissioner, and is closer to Model C.  
6. The three models are presented as examples of how a formal process for 
public appointments has been developed elsewhere, guided by the principles 
of transparency, accountability and independence from political patronage. It 
is not proposed that any model would be adopted by Ireland in a rigid 
fashion; instead, it may be appropriate to adopt aspects of different models. 
Practice in some other countries exhibit aspects of different models (e.g. 
Nova Scotia). In deciding what process for public appointments best suits 
Ireland’s future needs, the explicit objective must be erasing the longstanding 
culture of political patronage and replacing it with a culture which recognises 
the importance of merit and diversity.  
 
                                                          
5
 Maer, Lucinda“The Commissioner for Public Appointments”: Parliament and Constitution Centre; 18 
November 2010 p.6 
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Current practice: problems and issues 
Absence of coherent approach to establishment of Public Bodies 
7. In 2006, TASC identified 479 public bodies operating at national level.6 Most 
of these were created after 1990. However, quantifying the precise number 
of public bodies is problematic in the absence of an agreed definition of a 
‘public body’. For this reason, different agencies may be included in the lists 
compiled by different researchers. The lack of an official, comprehensive 
State directory compounds this problem. TASC’s initial investigation 
deliberately included ‘task forces’ and other similarly impermanent bodies, 
which nonetheless involve important public appointments and have 
potentially significant influence over the formation of public policy. However, 
even this research did not necessarily capture all temporary forums or 
committees established by Ministers to advise them on specific matters. 
8. The recently-launched Irish State Administration Database (www.isad.ie) now 
records information about all national-level public organisations (i.e. central 
Government departments and the agencies under their aegis, commercial 
State-owned enterprises and other relevant public bodies and institutions). In 
January 2011, there were 349 active bodies listed in this database.7 As 
recently as 1998, it was thought that only 130 public bodies were functioning 
in the State.8 Thus, the growth rate over the last decade is startling. 
9. Combining the data compiled in both the ISAD list with the list drawn up by 
TASC, over 600 different, current public bodies and boards/committees can 
                                                          
6
 See Clancy, P. and Murphy, G. (2006) Outsourcing Government: Public Bodies and Accountability, Dublin: 
TASC@New Island, for definition of a national public body and for a full list of these bodies. 
7
 Hardiman, Niamh; MacCarthaigh, Muiris and Scott, Colin. 2011. The Irish State Administration Database. 
http://www.isad.ie  [Accessed April 2011] 
8
 Coakley, John; Gallagher, Michael: “Politics in the Republic of Ireland” 4
th
 Edition Routledge  2005 p. 392 
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be identified, operating on a nation-wide basis.9 A large number of additional 
bodies exist which operate only on a local or regional basis. 
10. Ireland has a relatively large number of public bodies, many of whose 
governance structures include a board comprising a non-executive chair and 
members. For example, in 2010 MacCarthaigh identified 249 non-commercial 
national level agencies, three-quarters of which had a board or governing 
councils, giving rise to a total of 2,304 board/council memberships.10 Much of 
the discussion of public bodies assumes that the mere fact of growing 
numbers is ample evidence that we have too many, and that the appropriate 
response is simply to cut the number of bodies. However, TASC has 
consistently argued that, while there is an urgent need to review the number, 
it must be done in a constructive manner which recognises that many public 
functions require public bodies to exist as instruments of government, and 
which values their role. We therefore welcome the 2008 OECD report on the 
Irish public service,11 which deals with the subject in a more nuanced way. 
11. The OECD report called for the establishment of an overall governance 
framework for agencies. This, in turn, would require fundamental decisions 
on what should remain within central departments, what should be devolved 
to local government and what should be carried out at arm’s length from the 
civil service. Only then can decisions be taken not only about the number of 
agencies, but also about how they should be structured and governed. It is 
                                                          
9
 There are a number of factors to be considered when explaining the disparity in the lists compiled by 
TASC and the Irish State Administration Database. TASC’s list was compiled in late 2005, while the ISAD list 
was released in 2010. The ISAD list measures the durable state capacity through formally constituted 
public bodies, whereas TASC’s list includes other boards/committees where public appointment may 
occur. For example, ministerial departments were not included in the TASC list, while they were in the 
ISAD list; prison visiting committees, tribunals, taskforces; and a number of hospitals and education 
centres were omitted from the ISAD list, while TASC excluded a number of government appointed offices 
(e.g. the office of the DPP, the office of public works, the Central Statistics Office etc.) The variation in the 
two compilations is indicative of the degree of ambiguity around the definition of a ‘public body’. 
10
 MacCarthaigh (July 2010) 
11
 Ireland: Towards an Integrated Public Service (OECD Report, 2008); available at 
www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/ireland 
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worth noting that the OECD seemed to favour what it describes as “the latest 
waves of agencification in OECD countries” which includes the creation of 
“departmental agencies”.  These are bodies that have significant managerial 
autonomy, although they are not legally separated from the Civil Service and, 
crucially, have no board. These ideas are worthy of serious consideration as 
part of a rational and coherent design of the public service including the core 
civil service. 
12. Following receipt of the OECD report, which it had commissioned, the 
Government established a taskforce on the public service.  The taskforce’s 
remit included outlining “… an appropriate framework for the establishment 
and operation and governance of State agencies.”12 In its report, published in 
November 2008, it recommended, inter alia, that there should be a detailed 
review of existing public bodies to “identify opportunities to amalgamate, 
rationalise and make greater use of shared services”, as well as development 
of a new governance framework which would cover the appointment of 
directors to State boards and the functioning of boards.13  
13. Arising from these recommendations, the Special Group on Public Service 
Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (colloquially known as ‘An Bord Snip 
Nua’) was formed and subsequently made recommendations on the 
rationalisation of State agencies, while the Department of Finance developed 
a new governance framework for State bodies that was published in June 
2009.14 The extent to which this code of practice is being enforced is not 
clear. 
14. Parliamentary questions tabled in 2006 provide evidence of appointments 
over a ten-year period. These show that, between January 1997 and January 
                                                          
12
 Our italics 
13
 ‘Transforming public services’, Report of the Task Force on the Public Service, Department of the 
Taoiseach, November, 2008. 
14
 ‘Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies’, Department of Finance, June 2009 
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2006, ministers had made nearly 7,000 such appointments.15 The new 
Programme for Government provides for the proposed rationalisation of 
State-sponsored bodies, which could lead to a considerable reduction in the 
number of public appointments. Similarly, if a review of agencies results in a 
reduction in the number of public bodies with boards of non-executive 
directors, fewer public appointments would be made. 
15. Although the emphasis on State-sponsored bodies is appropriate, the 
appointments to less permanent task forces, forums and similar bodies also 
need to be considered in any rationalisation and reform of public 
appointments. 
16. The new Programme for Government contains no detailed outline of how 
public appointments will take place in the future. It does, however, set out 
some plans which, if implemented, would go some way towards changing the 
shape of public appointments. These include: 
 An undertaking to ensure that, where appropriate, agency boards are 
scrapped and agency managers held directly accountable to 
Ministers.16 
 A promise to take steps to ensure that all State boards are comprised 
of at least 40 per cent of each gender.17 
 
 A commitment to amend the rules governing senior public servants 
(including political appointees) and Ministers. The new rules would 
ensure that none of them can work in the private sector, in any area 
involving a potential conflict of interest with their former area of 
public employment, until at least two years have elapsed since they 
left the public service.18 
                                                          
15
 Parliamentary questions tabled by Deputy Dan Boyle, Dáil Éireann, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 613, 
25.01.2006.  See also follow-up questions: Vol. 616, 07.03.2006 
16
 Towards Recovery: Programme for National Government 2011-2016 6
th
 [March 2001] p.24 
17
 ibid p.53 
18
 ibid p.20 




17. As stated above, the new Programme for Government states that the 
Government will substantially reduce the number of State-sponsored bodies. 
With the exception of plans to cut governmental committees19, the proposals 
outlined in the document focus on the merging of existing bodies. They 
include plans to develop a single Irish Agri-Food brand which would 
amalgamate State agencies,20 a promise to merge transport services,21 and a 
commitment to merge all marine responsibilities under one Department.22 
Additionally the programme outlines the Government’s intention to combine 
a variety of small hospitals into one local hospital network.23 
Ad hoc and politicised system of selection 
18. At present, Ministers and senior civil servants are responsible for appointing 
the majority of those serving on boards of public bodies. Ministers may be 
constrained by written criteria governing certain appointments. But in many 
cases appointments are entirely at the Minister’s discretion, requiring neither 
justification nor any evidence that appointments have been made on the 
basis of stated criteria, following careful consideration of different 
candidates’ qualifications. The mere fact of ministerial patronage, and the 
potential for abuse involved, is compounded by an opaque selection 
procedure. Many bodies list their board members on their website but very 
few include an explanation of the selection criteria used. Even in cases where 
there is an official selection process, the public is ill-informed on how it 
operates. Overall, there is a lack of clarity regarding the expertise or 
experience which might objectively justify an appointment, and there is no 
                                                          
19
 ibid p.19 
20
 ibid p.12 
21
 ibid p.12 
22
 ibid p.64 
23
 ibid p.35 
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effective independent input into the appointments process. The Oireachtas 
has negligible influence on public appointments, since they are at the 
Minister’s sole discretion.24 
19. Appointments typically result from a number of inputs and processes. 
Initially, individual civil servants, drawing on their experience and contacts, 
submit a list of names to the Minister for approval. The Minister then draws 
up a shortlist, drawing to a greater or lesser extent on the names submitted 
by the civil servants. Other elements may also come into play: coalition 
government agreements may require that the list include nominees of both 
the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste while, in certain cases, social partners or 
other stakeholders may also have been granted nomination rights, either in 
statute or on a de facto basis. 
20. In addition to addressing the potential for political patronage, a more formal 
and consistent system of public appointments would avoid a situation where 
any social partners or other stakeholder groups had undue influence in 
nominating people to public boards. Reform could facilitate stakeholders 
having a role, but this would be limited to input on the code of practice, 
protocols and competencies required by any particular public board. In a 
legitimate appointments system, the role of stakeholders, including the 
Minister, should not extend to simply naming individuals for appointment 
without undergoing an open selection process.25 
21. In practice, it is often left to the Minister or his/her political advisor to draw 
up a list of potential names. While there may be a genuine attempt to 
establish a nexus of expertise, the whole process is arbitrary, unmonitored 
                                                          
24
 Recently it was announced that an Oireachtas committee will question nominated chairs of transport 
agencies for their suitability (Irish Examiner, Monday 4 July 2011).  
25
 The only exception to this rule would be where boards of bodies, notably commercial semi-states, have 
one or more board members elected by employees. 
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and unsystematic. It is also at the mercy of subjective – and thus biased – 
judgements. 
22. The secrecy surrounding Ministerial patronage, and the potential for abuse, is 
compounded by a lack of accountability. Not only is there no onus on the 
Minister to justify an appointment at the time: there is also no process 
whereby the Minister can subsequently be held accountable for the 
appointee’s performance (or lack thereof). Indeed, it may be difficult or 
impossible for the public to assess an appointee’s performance. For example, 
in the case of the many ad hoc task-centred advisory committees which are 
disbanded once a particular project has been completed, only the Minister 
being advised is in a position to evaluate the appointee’s performance. And 
there is often no discernible relationship between performance and tenure: 
while theoretically the Minister has substantial powers of dismissal, these are 
rarely exercised in practice. 
23. Our current system of appointments-by-Ministers has arguably given elite 
groups a near-monopoly over public board positions, and thus inordinate and 
unaccountable influence over public policy. Essentially, the governing party – 
regardless of ideological hue – is allowed to shape public boards in its own 
(political) image. Since appointments to such boards do not coincide with Dáil 
elections, the governing party is able to exercise influence well beyond its 
term of office. The difficulty that the new Fine Gael-Labour Government 
experienced in removing appointees of the previous administration further 
emphasises this point.26 
24. Concerns about public appointments are not just a recent development. 
Those which live on in the public mind are those surrounded by a whiff of 
cronyism. As far back as 1991 – when there were far fewer  public bodies, 
                                                          
26
 See, for example, Irish Independent (23 March 2011) and Irish Examiner (29 March 2011). 
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and hence ministerial  appointments, than now – controversy surrounded the 
position of Michael Smurfit, former chairman of Telecom Éireann, following 
questions about Telecom’s acquisition of the Johnston, Mooney and O’Brien 
site. 
25. A more recent example which serves to highlight the issues surrounding 
political patronage relates to former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern’s friend Joe 
Burke. Eyebrows were raised when members of Bertie Ahern’s circle of 
friends were appointed to State boards. The appointment of Joe Burke – one 
of the former Taoiseach’s friends and donors – as chairperson of the Dublin 
Port Company was particularly illustrative of how a nexus of political and 
business contacts gave rise to perceptions of undue influence. A former 
Fianna Fáil Councillor, Mr Burke was also a trustee of Bertie Ahern’s 
Drumcondra constituency office, St. Luke’s.27 Mr Burke was appointed 
chairman of Dublin Port Company in 2002, and also held a seat on East-Link 
Ltd, the toll bridge subsidiary of NTR.  He was also a director of Renore Ltd, 
the company which owned Greenore Harbour in Co Louth.  In 2002, Dublin 
Port Company and the Irish Agricultural Wholesale Society Ltd, now trading 
as the One51 Group, obtained ministerial approval to establish a joint 
venture to acquire the shares of Greenore Port Company.  This shows the 
potential risk of a conflict of interest. Other questions can be asked of Mr 
Burke’s suitability. A High Court order restricted him from involvement in the 
affairs of any company for five years unless certain funding conditions were 
met. This order followed the liquidation of his building company with a deficit 
of €2.3 million and tax debts of €279,000. Yet he remained in situ as 
chairman of the Dublin Port Company for a number of months following 
this.28 
                                                          
27




 Irish Times, January 12
th
 2009 
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26. Like certain other agencies, the Dublin Port Company is not subject to the 
Freedom of Information Acts and is thus not required to provide information 
about itself.  However, we do know that the chairman’s fee in 2007 was 
€24,000 and that the total remuneration bill for Dublin Port Company’s 11 
directors came to nearly €600,000 in 2006.  
The issue of payment for public service 
27. In the private sector, the excessive pay awarded to board members has been 
identified as a risk factor related to board members’ independence.29 
Furthermore, many of the Directors receiving very high pay rates often hold 
multiple directorships. This means they tend to be overstretched and that the 
companies paying them may be getting poor value for their money.30  
28. In the case of the public sector, while a similar issue arises in relation to some 
board positions, in general remuneration is small or non-existent. There are 
pros and cons to remunerating appointees to public boards. The absence of 
remuneration may have been designed to foster a culture of volunteerism 
and public service, paradoxically, however, it has reinforced the perception 
that appointments are made for solely political reasons. The absence of 
formal remuneration has also resulted in an increased focus on daily 
allowances and mileage, the perceived abuse of which has increased public 
suspicion of State boards. Arguments can be made that some remuneration 
is appropriate, not only to increase accountability but also to enable a much 
greater level of diversity, allowing those who could otherwise not afford the 
loss of earnings involved in the time commitment required to board 
responsibilities to accept appointment. 
                                                          
29
 Paula Clancy, Nat O’Connor, Kevin Dillon; “Mapping the Golden Circle” TASC May 2010 p. 25 
30
 ibid at p.29 
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Proposals for reform 
29. The potential of public appointments to serve as a political legacy becomes 
apparent when one considers the dramatic historical rise in appointments 
immediately before and after a general election, and prior to a minister’s 
departure from office. During the two months before the 2007 general 
election, around 700 appointments were made – over three times the 
average appointment rate. Similarly, in the weeks between former Taoiseach 
Bertie Ahern’s announcement of his forthcoming resignation and the 
formation of a new Cabinet, over 100 new appointments were made to State 
boards. This figure contrasts with just eight appointments made during the 
six weeks preceding Mr. Ahern’s resignation announcement.32 
30. This trend is ongoing. In the run up to the February 2011 General Election 
(from 14 December to 13 January) 90 appointments were made to State 
boards. This became the focus of intense scrutiny and was highlighted by the 
opposition parties during Dáil debates. In addition, the issue garnered a 
significant amount of media attention. Fine Gael’s Leo Varadkar accused 
Fianna Fáil of “stuffing State boards with friends and political party 
supporters” before later retracting his comments, stating that he “was 
making no allegation about any individual”.33 Insinuations of cronyism on 
State boards are commonplace. However, outright accusations of this nature 
are not. This is because the corroborating evidence is simply not available. 
Given the lack of transparency surrounding public appointments, this is 
unsurprising.  Despite his swift reversal on the issue, Deputy Varadkar’s 
accusations may have had some impact because on 1 February 2011 – the 
first day of the 2011 election campaign – the Government publicly introduced 
new rules surrounding appointments to State boards, as well as undertaking 
not to make any more appointments before vacancies occur. The 
                                                          
32




 Irish Times, January 20
th
, 2011 “FF TD calls on Varadkar to apologise over cronyism claims” 
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Government also promised that, where vacancies do arise, no new 
appointments would be made where it is “clearly necessary to consider 
changes in the function or structure of a State body”.34 While the 
Government’s promises here were broad and relatively unspecific, the fact 
that they were made at all might indicates a realization that public 
appointments have now become a significant issue in the minds of voters. 
31. The importance of, and possibly the electoral advantages associated with, 
reforming public bodies and appointments to the boards of such bodies have 
not escaped political parties.  Fine Gael’s election manifesto included 
promises to cut the number of current ‘quangos’ by at least 150. It pledged to 
require the Chairpersons of all State boards, agencies and regulators to 
submit their resignations within one year of the Oireachtas passing a Public 
Appointments Transparency Bill. It also stated that previous Chairpersons will 
be permitted to reapply to serve on State boards, but that they will be 
scrutinised by the relevant Dáil committees.35 In 2010, Fine Gael enterprise 
spokesperson Richard Bruton promised that, if elected, Fine Gael would 
replace the membership of every board within six months.36 
32. Labour made 140 proposals to transform government, politics and the public 
service,37 including a promise to establish an Office of Public Service Reform, 
with responsibility for all matters in relation to the public service and headed 
by a Minister who sits in cabinet. The office envisaged will have a particular 
responsibility for planning and implementing the change agenda. The idea 
was that the office will also be responsible for ensuring that all aspects of the 
agenda are explained fully to the public and to public sector staff.38 Labour 
                                                          
34
 Irish Times, February 2
nd
 2011 “Government alters rules on State boards post”  
35
 NewPolitics, Fine Gael (accessed at: www.finegael.org/upload/NewPolitics.pdf )p.9 
36
 Irish Times, December 12
th
, 2010 “Fine Gael wants appointments freeze” 
37
 New Government, Better Government; Changing a Broken System accessed at: 
www.labour.ie/download/pdf/newgovernmentbettergovernment.pdf 
38
 ibid p.19 point 83 
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also promised to review the number of State bodies and reduce their 
numbers where appropriate.39 In addition, Labour stated that it would ensure 
State bodies are subject to the same reporting requirements as their parent 
departments.40 Finally, Labour’s manifesto undertook to “review the 
structure of all organisations and bodies to ensure that each one and each of 
its divisions, agencies and units are engaged in work that contributes to 
organisational goals”.41 
33. Sinn Féin has, in the past, called for a new transparency and greater diversity 
(particularly regarding the representation of women) in public 
appointments.42 Sinn Féin’s 2011 election manifesto promised to impose a 
significant cull on public bodies, retaining only those “essential to the public 
interest”.43 Sinn Féin pledged to make all State boards “answerable to the 
Oireachtas through relevant committees and ministers, with transparency 
and efficiency in decision-making.”44 It stated that it would establish an All-
Ireland Parliamentary and Consultative Civic Forum and complete the Review 
of the All-Ireland Implementation bodies with particular consideration of the 
case for additional bodies.45 Sinn Féin’s manifesto included a pledge to end 
political appointments to State boards, stating that there needs to be an 
open and transparent system of appointments to State bodies.46 
34. Public appointments reform was not addressed by either Fianna Fáil or the 
Green Party in their 2011 election manifestos. The Green Party had 
previously, in opposition, introduced legislation on this issue. The issue also 
                                                          
39
 ibid p.19 point 84 
40
 ibid p.19 point 86.  
41
 ibid p.22 point 114.  
42
 www.mayosinnfein.com/policy/women [accessed 10/02/2011] 
43
 Sinn Féin General Election Manifesto 2011 p. 35 point n; accessed at: 
www.sinnfein.ie/files/SF_GeneralElectionManifesto2011.pdf 
44
 ibid p.35 point o 
45
 ibid p.35 point p 
46
 ibid p.35 point q 
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did not feature in their combined 2007 Programme for Government,47 
however it was in the 2009 Renewed Programme for Government: “We will 
introduce on a legislative basis a more open and transparent system for 
appointments to public bodies. The legislation will outline a procedure for the 
publication of all vacancies likely to occur, invite applications from the general 
public and from the responses, create a panel of suitable persons for 
consideration of appointment. The legislation will also specify numbers of 
persons to be appointed by a Minister and will facilitate the appropriate 
Oireachtas Committees to make nominations to the panel.” Unfortunately, 
this commitment was not progressed before that Government fell. 
35. The fact that the issue of public appointments is being raised by most 
political parties highlights how significant it has become. Moreover, 
reforming public bodies and appointments to these bodies are not issues that 
have been picked up on simply by political parties. Independent politicians 
have also offered opinions. For example, Shane Ross claimed that cronyism 
was the biggest issue in the election and that the government had been 
appointing their own “cronies” to the boards of banks since stepping in to 
rescue the institutions.48  Shane Ross advocated the establishment of an 
independent commission to make appointments to State boards.49 
36. It has sometimes been argued that Ireland is too small to require an 
independent commission. However, the example of Scotland shows that it is 
possible and useful to have the independent Scottish Public Appointments 
Commissioner overseeing a significantly smaller number of bodies (fewer 
than 100). 
                                                          
47
 Programme for Government 2007-2012 
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 Irish Examiner; 10
th
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37. The Irish Small and Medium Enterprises Association (ISME)50 and the Institute 
of Directors in Ireland51 have both recently called for the establishment of an 
independent process for appointments to the boards of public bodies. 
Public Good versus Private Benefit 
38. The fact that public appointments are a Ministerial function has given rise to 
the suspicion – whether well-founded or not – that such appointments 
constitute a reward for political or other services rendered, and that some 
appointees are motivated less by a desire to serve the public good than by 
self-interest, or by narrow political interests.  
39. There are a number of links, through shared directors, between private 
companies and State-owned bodies. These connections appear to be 
common. A quick scan of the boards of many Irish public bodies shows that a 
disproportionate number are populated by members of the business 
community. Many people who work in, or are board members of, private or 
listed companies are recruited to the boards of State-owned companies with 
responsibilities in the same sector. Former senior public service officials are 
also recruited to the boards of private companies. An example of this is that 
Central Bank directors were appointed to commercial banks once their terms 
at the Central Bank ended. Additionally, there have been occasions where 
AIB and Bank of Ireland directors have sat simultaneously on the Board of the 
Central Bank. After retiring from the board of Irish Life and Permanent, the 
CEO was appointed CEO of the Financial Regulator’s office. 
40. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with such dual service: indeed, 
the State has often been indebted to the businessmen and women who have 
placed their expertise at the disposal of public bodies. However, there is an 
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 Irish Times; 28
th
 April 2011 “Ending political influence will make appointments to State boards 
transparent” 
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obvious potential for real or perceived conflicts of interest when personnel 
serve on the boards of both public bodies and private enterprises, especially 
when the sectors concerned overlap. As TASC pointed out in Mapping the 
Golden Circle, six of the 11 most well connected directors in Ireland sat on 
the boards of both private and public companies. For example, as well as his 
involvement in private companies like Anglo Irish Bank, Sean FitzPatrick was a 
member of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority and was also a 
Government appointee to the Board of Aer Lingus.52 The controversy that 
arose over the ties between the Dublin Docklands Development Authority 
and Anglo-Irish Bank provides a notable example of the degree to which 
public and private sectors have become blurred.53 
41. Most recently, it was revealed that Sean FitzPatrick, Lar Bradshaw and Donal 
O’Connor have all, at various times, served  on the boards of both Anglo Irish 
Bank, which – until its recent troubles – invested significantly in property 
development, and the public Dublin Docklands Authority which oversees 
development in the Docklands area. The blurring between the public and 
private sector has resulted in consequences adverse to the public interest. In 
relation to the involvement of Sean Fitzpatrick and Lar Bradshaw on the 
boards of the Dublin Docklands Development Authority and Anglo Irish Bank, 
newly appointed DDDA chair Niamh Brennan said that because of Anglo’s 
influence, the Dublin Dockland Development Authority “became very focused 
on development and used planning to facilitate and encourage development” 
and that “the association between Anglo and the DDDA has not served the 
authority well.”54 
42. The UK Code of Practice governing ministerial appointments to public bodies 
cogently analyses the potential for conflicts of interests which may arise 
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when making appointments, and outlines the measures which must be in 
place to protect against such conflicts.55 The Code identifies five issues most 
frequently encountered which could lead to real or apparent conflicts of 
interest. One of these relates to relationships and associations, including 
those of friendship and the potential for such to either influence actions or 
be perceived as doing so. The presence of such an issue is sufficient grounds 
for excluding a candidate for appointment. Other such grounds include the 
potential perception of the appointment as a reward for past or future 
contributions or favours, and circumstances where awareness of pending 
government policy arising from a board position could represent an unfair 
advantage for those with related business interests. 
43. Critics of the UK regulations claim they are too broad and there have been 
calls to revamp the system.56 A preference for independence from 
parliament, as seen in the Scottish system, has been voiced by some UK 
commentators.57 For example, the Scottish Commissioner is not allied to the 
parliament, helping to ensure that public appointments are more separate 
than they are in the rest of the UK. The UK’s Code of Practice had drawn 
criticism for being less specific than the Scottish model.58 
44. It is important to note that a small country like Ireland has to operate under 
different conditions. It is, in some respects, inevitable that potential board 
members are more likely to be known to one another than in larger 
jurisdictions. However, this can be compensated for by having a more formal, 
independent system of public appointments – such as the Scottish system. 
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Scotland is a good comparator since it has a comparable population size to 
Ireland. The cliché that ‘everyone knows everyone’ should not be allowed to 
mask the fact that directors are often sought from a very limited pool of 
people. With a population of 4.4 million, there is no doubt that many 
qualified and competent candidates could be found without difficulty to fill 
public appointments. In addition, there is no reason why appointments 
should be limited to Irish nationals, especially when specific expertise is 
required. 
Appointing political activists 
45. While there are obvious potential problems surrounding the appointment of 
political activists by Ministers of the same political party, there is also no 
doubt that political activism is crucial to the development and maintenance 
of a vibrant civil society. Therefore, any code of practice governing public 
appointments must avoid discouraging such activism. This conflict between 
the need to avoid political favouritism, on the one hand, and to encourage 
political involvement by citizens, on the other, has been extensively debated 
in the UK in the context of their appointments process. This has been 
resolved by requiring candidates for public appointment to complete a 
political activity questionnaire, which is subsequently made available for 
public scrutiny. Likewise, any refusal to complete the questionnaire is 
recorded. 
Preventing ‘groupthink’ 
46. A serious concern with drawing on the same (small) pool is the problem of 
‘groupthink’ (exemplified by the collective blindness demonstrated by non-
executive boards in the period predating the current crisis). Groupthink is a 
well-recognised psychological phenomenon, occurring when decision-making 
is carried out by small groups. The result is that alternative or contrary 
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evidence is ignored when conclusions are reached or decisions are made.59 
This happens due to the group’s strong desire to reach a consensus. 
47. One of the obvious solutions to the risk of groupthink is to ensure board 
members reflect the full diversity of society. In fact, diversity is an effective 
method for reducing the risk of ‘groupthink’ while increasing the likelihood 
that appointees will be independent in their work. In Mapping the Golden 
Circle, TASC noted that the Director Network (a small number of directors in 
40 of Ireland’s top private companies and State-owned bodies who hold 
multiple directorships on the boards of these 40 organisations)60 is largely 
made up of men who are of similar ages, live in close geographical proximity 
and are likely to have attended the same schools and university.61 Moreover, 
TASC found a marked imbalance in the gender composition of boards. At 18 
per cent, the proportion of women serving as Directors on public boards is 
certainly better than the figure for private boards, which stands at 6.5 per 
cent.  However, 18 per cent still falls a long way short of the long-standing 
public policy commitment to achieving a minimum of a 40 per cent female 
membership of public bodies. 
The issue of diversity 
48. Not only is diversity important to address concerns about groupthink, but 
achieving a diversity among public appointments has further substantive 
importance in its own right. The public interest requires that public 
appointments reflect society in terms of social class, gender, geography, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, etc. The appointment of suitably qualified 
people from diverse backgrounds makes it more likely that the boards of 
public bodies will act upon a broader range of public concerns. However, 
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ensuring this broad representation is a challenge which has not yet been fully 
met, even in those jurisdictions with state-of-the-art procedures. For 
example, recent figures in the UK show that women accounted for only 34.7 
per cent of public appointees; people from ethnic minorities currently hold 
less than seven per cent of posts62 (a figure which has actually fallen),63 
despite making up nearly eleven per cent of the population; and people with 
a disability currently account for 3.9 per cent of appointees, even though 14 
per cent of the working age population has a disability.64 In 2009, plans were 
put in place to ensure that by 2011 the figure for women appointed to State 
boards would reach 50 per cent, disabled people would make up 14 per cent 
and 11 per cent of public appointments would be ethnic minorities.65 While it 
is unclear what the actual outcome will be by year-end, setting such clear 
goals is an essential prerequisite if progress is to be made. 
Poor accountability and transparency 
49. Starting with the Ombudsman’s Act 1980, various governments have 
introduced measures to provide for more accountability and transparency in 
the governance of the State, including its public bodies.  The decision on 
which bodies should come under the scrutiny of the various oversight bodies 
has been a matter of considerable contention.  Decisions regarding which 
bodies should be covered by a particular piece of accountability/transparency 
legislation are taken on a case-by-case basis, and there are often a number of 
explicit exemptions. Indeed, the Ombudsman has repeatedly challenged a 
number of exclusions from coverage of her office. Also, in her role as 
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Information Commissioner, she has stated that the exclusion of a number of 
public bodies from the freedom of information act was a retrograde step.66 
50. There is no doubt that, following a series of controversies during the early 
1990s, mechanisms were put in place to increase the accountability of central 
government.  Such mechanisms include, for example, the enactment of 
Freedom of Information and Ethics in Public Office legislation, as well as more 
recent initiatives such as the 2009 Code of Practice for the Governance of 
State Boards. However, while all of these measures were designed to foster a 
culture of transparency, they often stop short at the door of public bodies – 
or, more precisely, at the boardroom door. Too many public bodies are 
specifically exempted from such oversight legislation. These exemptions were 
addressed comprehensively by TASC in 2006,67 and a few examples may 
suffice here:  
 Around 50 public bodies are explicitly exempted from application of the 
Ombudsman’s Act, including the Refugee Applications Tribunal;  
 Nine public bodies are explicitly exempted from application of the 
Children’s Ombudsman’s Act; 
 Half of all public bodies are not subject to the Ethics in Public Office 
legislation; 
 A number of crucial public bodies, ranging from the National Pension 
Reserve Fund and Central Bank to the Garda Síochána, are exempted 
from Freedom of Information legislation;68 
 Certain public bodies are not subject to financial control and auditing 
provisions. 
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51. The number of public bodies to which the current Code of Practice for the 
Governance of State Bodies applies is unclear.  A list of the State bodies to 
which it applies is not appended in the relevant schedule.  While the Code of 
Practice, in principle, does apply to both commercial and non-commercial 
State bodies, there is provision for waiving elements of the Code which are 
not regarded as ‘appropriate’ to a particular State body on a case-by-case 
basis, and with the permission of the relevant Minister. We argue that 
accountability legislation must be applied fully to all bodies responsible for 
public functions, and that exemptions should only be granted in accordance 
with specified criteria agreed in an open and transparent manner.69 
52. Creating a culture of transparency within our public bodies must thus involve 
a two-pronged approach: ensuring that the greatest number possible are 
rendered subject to our legislative ‘transparency framework’ – and ensuring 
that the boards of such bodies are appointed and managed in a way which is 
accountable to both Government and the wider public. 
Principles for reform 
53. Any reform of the Irish public appointments system must be ultimately 
informed by the public interest, and by debate regarding what is in the public 
interest. There needs to be strategic thinking about public appointments. 
Such strategic thinking is vital to ensure that public appointments are 
planned and integrated into a wider strategy, rather than being ad hoc and 
fragmented, and to ensure that such appointments do not continue drawing 
from the same limited pool. We have identified three guiding principles that 
vindicate the public interest is in relation to public appointments: 
 Appointments based on merit; 
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 Respect for diversity; 
 Transparency. 
54. Selection on the basis of merit requires that the best available candidate is 
selected and appointed to each post. This ensures that appointees are 
appropriately qualified, competent, experienced and have the requisite 
expertise to carry out their role in governing a public body. 
55. Respect for diversity requires appointees to be drawn from all sections of 
society. Showing respect for diversity ensures more equality, in terms of the 
appointment of more women, more young and older people, more people 
from different ethnic background, more people from different socio-
economic backgrounds, etc. Diversity ensures maximum civil society 
participation, and is an effective method for reducing the risk of ‘groupthink’ 
while increasing the likelihood that appointees will be independent in their 
work. For example, inclusion of Ireland’s new ethnic minorities is important 
to ensure that public bodies are genuinely inclusive and that public policy 
reflects a more diverse population. Ireland’s new communities include many 
people who would be highly qualified to participate on the board of a public 
body, but without a formal process for inclusion they are less likely to be 
called upon to participate. 
56. Respect for diversity requires public appointments to be made within a 
framework that looks at the overall composition of boards, and ensures that 
individual appointments complement the existing balance of competences 
and backgrounds of those already appointed. Yet in Ireland, unlike in the UK, 
beyond figures for gender, we do not have the data routinely available to 
monitor the level of diversity in appointees to State bodies (e.g. in relation to 
disability or ethnicity). This might be interpreted as a lack of commitment to 
encouraging diversity and could be easily remedied. 
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57. Transparency is a guiding principle on multiple levels. The overall process of 
public appointments must be implemented through fair and open 
procedures. There must be disclosure by appointees to ensure probity. For 
example, a declaration of interests and political activities would be 
appropriate. Transparency also ensures that there is a clear division of 
responsibility, so that both appointees and the wider public are aware of who 
is responsible for what aspect of a public body’s performance and activities. 
58. The three principles of merit, diversity and transparency are not sufficient as 
mere goals or objectives. There is a clear requirement for formal mechanisms 
to ensure that these principles are achieved in concrete terms. The Models (A 
to C) presented in this paper are examples of how formal mechanisms might 
be combined into a system for public appointments. Mechanisms to be 
considered must include, inter alia: 
 Independent scrutiny of appointments; 
 Auditing of appointments; 
 Public reports on appointments; 
 Performance assessment of appointees; 
 Sanctions for appointees who do not perform well; 
 Statistics on the diversity of appointments; 
 Term limits for certain types of appointment or reappointment; 
 Remuneration (or not) of appointees; 
 When (or if) public servants should be appointees; 
 Involvement by the Department and/or relevant public bodies in the 
appointment process. 
59. Whichever combination of formal mechanisms is chosen, there is a need for 
proportionality. That is, the length, complexity, arduousness and therefore 
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cost of appointment procedures should be commensurate to the nature and 
responsibilities of the post being filled, and to the strategic importance and 
influence of the public body in question. 
Towards a new model of public appointments: the options 
60. In this final section we outline in more detail three potential models for 
reforming the appointments process, based on experience in other 
jurisdictions with legal and administrative backgrounds similar to Ireland’s, 
taking account of Irish administrative practices and institutional structures. 
As stated in the introduction, reforms undertaken by Canada, New Zealand, 
Scotland and the wider UK have all been effective to varying degrees. The 
different practices implemented in each case provide a strong basis from 
which Ireland can learn, potentially drawing aspects from different models to 
create a formal process appropriate to Ireland’s needs. 
61. The reforms implemented in these jurisdictions include moves towards 
reducing discretionary ministerial powers, the enactment of new legislation 
and the establishment of new oversight institutions. Codes of practice, 
protocols, processes and appointment decisions have been widely publicised, 
thereby allowing public scrutiny of the appointments process. By granting 
legislative committees the power of veto over ministerial appointments, 
Nova Scotia in Canada has moved even further towards independent 
appointments. 
Overview of Models 
62. As discussed at the outset, the three models presented here represent 
examples of how a formal process for public appointments has been 
developed elsewhere, guided by the principles of transparency, 
accountability and independence from political patronage. Model A provides 
for a formal system of transparency to open up appointments to wider public 
scrutiny. Model B (essentially the UK model) adds a formal process of 
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oversight to scrutinise appointments. Model C goes furthest by establishing 
an independent agency to carry out public appointments. As will be shown 
below, it is possible to envisage different aspects of appointments being 
guided by different models. The examination of the three models also 
illustrates that certain practices are common to two or even all three of 
them. What is essential in each case is that a degree of formality and 
consistency of approach replaces ad hoc measures, which are open to the 
perception (if not the reality) of patronage. 
Preparation 






Model A – Transparency Model B –Transparency 
with Oversight 
Model C – Independent 
Public Appointments 
Preparation Code of practice prepared 
and made publicly 
available. 
Position descriptions and 
selection criteria made 
publicly available. 
New or existing 
independent authority (e.g. 




appointed to oversee 
appointments which 
continue to be managed 
within each government 
department. 
Code of practice, position 
descriptions and election 
criteria made publicly 
available. 
New or existing independent 
authority (e.g. Commission for 
Public Service Appointments) 
appointed to oversee 
appointments and to arrange 
an independent selection 
process; for example by the 
Public Appointments Service 
(PAS)72 or a recognised agency 
licensed by the CPSA. 
Code of practice, position 
descriptions and election 
criteria made publicly 
available. 
Independent authority ensures 
comprehensive selection 
process in line with merit and 
diversity principles. 
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63. Preparation for making public appointments refers to the background work 
that is required to facilitate a formal process of making public appointments. 
Model A provides for transparency through the publication of relevant codes 
and job descriptions. Model B also strengthens oversight by the use of an 
independent body to oversee Government departments as they make 
appointments (which would be similar to the role of the Commission for 
Public Service Appointments in publishing standards and monitoring and 
auditing appointment processes). Model C provides for an independent body 
with the powers to carry out a selection process (which would be similar to 
how some civil and public service positions are recruited through the Public 
Appointments Service).73 
Candidate location 




Model A – Transparency Model B –Transparency 
with Oversight 








All board positions 
advertised on central 
government website and 
senior positions 
advertised in popular 
newspapers. 
All board positions 
advertised on central 
government website and 
senior positions 
advertised in popular 
newspapers. 
All board positions 
advertised on central 
government website and 
senior positions 
advertised in popular 
newspapers. 
 
64. Candidate location refers to the process of finding suitable candidates and 
encouraging them to apply for positions on public boards. Obviously, a 
reformed process of public appointments cannot simply allow political 
patronage through the backdoor through ‘invitation only’ application 
processes. It is noteworthy that all three models converge on public 
advertisement (i.e. transparency) as the solution to finding suitable 
candidates. In all three models, advertisement on Government websites is 
deemed sufficient for most posts, with only senior appointments requiring 
newspaper notices. 
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Assessment of candidates 




Model A – Transparency Model B –Transparency 
with Oversight 




Assessments carried out 
by departments in 
accordance with the 
code of practice. 
 
Details of conflicts of 
interest made publicly 
available. 
Assessments carried out 
by departments, with 
participation or 
oversight by the 
independent authority. 
 
Details of conflicts of 
interest made publicly 
available. 
Assessments carried out 
by the independent 
authority, possibly with 





Details of conflicts of 
interest made publicly 
available. 
 
65. Assessment of candidates refers to the process of determining the suitability 
of candidates for a post and potentially ranking them in order of merit. 
Model A requires transparency about the code of practice that sets out this 
process. Transparency also requires the publication of any conflicts of 
interest that affect the successful candidate(s); i.e. that appropriate conflicts 
of interest checks must be carried out and specified steps must be taken to 
address any conflicts that were identified. Model B adds oversight through 
the same independent body referred to under Preparation. Model C gives the 
independent body primacy in assessing candidates, with input from the 
relevant Government department. 
Selection and appointment 




Model A – Transparency Model B –Transparency 
with Oversight 






accordance with code of 
practice and relevant 
protocols. 
 
Names of appointees 
and reasons for 




accordance with code of 
practice and relevant 
protocols. 
 
Names of appointees 
and reasons for 
decisions made publicly 
available. 
Selection made by 
independent authority 
for appointment by 
Minister. 
Names of appointees 
and reasons for 
decisions made publicly 
available. 




66. Selection and appointment refers to the process of choosing between a 
number of candidates who have been deemed suitable for the post. Models 
A and B require that Ministers are guided by a published set of codes and 
protocols. Transparency also requires that the names of appointees are 
published, along with reasons for their appointment. There is an option for 
involving parliamentary committees in this process, but this should not dilute 
ministerial accountability for appointments, as committees (with 
Government majorities) will typically vote as directed. Model C gives the 
independent body the power to select candidates, with Ministers having the 
role of formally appointing them. 
Audit 




Model A – Transparency Model B –Transparency 
with Oversight 
Model C – Independent 
Public Appointments 
Audit None. Appointment processes 
subject to an audit by 
independent authority 
and details of the audit 
made publicly available. 
Appointment processes 
subject to an audit by 
independent authority 
and details of the audit 
made publicly available. 
 
 
67. Audit refers to the oversight of the whole system of appointments, to ensure 
adherence with the code of guidance, protocols, etc. Model A does not 
include any further mechanisms, beyond the transparency at each stage of 
the appointments process. Models B and C converge on giving the 
independent body the role of auditing and reporting publicly on the whole 
process. 
 




68. There are arguments for and against each of the three models; these are 
elaborated below. 
69. The core of Model A is to increase transparency. The arguments in favour of 
this model are that it leaves intact the Ministerial executive function, 
allowing democratically-elected governments to ensure that key aspects of 
public administration are operated according to their policy choices. 
Transparency would improve the ad hoc nature of the current system by 
ensuring it is codified and transparent, providing protection against potential 
conflicts of interest and/or appointment of unqualified people. The 
advertisement of positions allows for greater diversity and increases the 
likely pool of people with appropriate competencies. A codified and 
transparent system should increase public trust and foster a sense of 
citizenship and potential for engagement. 
70. The limitations of Model A are that appointments remain fully within the 
remit of the relevant Minister. Although more transparent, appointments are 
open to political patronage and cronyism. The system lacks accountability as 
there is no provision for audit of the process or its outcomes.  
71. Model B introduces oversight mechanisms alongside transparency. The 
arguments for this include all of the benefits of Model A. In addition, the 
existence of an independent oversight body will increase the likelihood that 
the code of practice will be implemented and will increase trust in the 
system. The fact that the appointment process is subject to audit by an 
independent authority would also increase the likelihood of compliance with 
the code. 
72. Model B has the same disadvantages as Model A, in that appointments are 
still potentially open to political patronage and cronyism. While an oversight 
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body and auditing process will improve compliance, the absence of sanctions 
for non-compliance is a limitation. 
73. The third model is for an independent body to be delegated some or all of 
the functions relevant to assessing and selecting candidates for appointment. 
Arguments in favour of Model C include the transparency of the process, plus 
the likely increase in candidate diversity. Likewise, a codified and transparent 
system should increase public trust and foster a sense of citizenship and 
potential for engagement. The independence of the oversight body should 
increase likelihood that the code of practice will be implemented and should 
increase public trust in the system. The fact that the appointments process is 
subjected to an independent audit should also increase compliance with the 
code. 
74. The main argument against Model C is that it could constrain Government’s 
capacity to ensure its policy programme is implemented through control of 
the appointments process (i.e. the more the agency is independent of 
government, the greater the risk of ‘mission creep’). 
75. When considering what elements of Models A, B and C would best suit 
Ireland’s needs, it is important to ensure that – whatever system is chosen – 
there is a move towards a more transparent and professional system of 
making public appointments. In this context, it is also worth considering 
whether different Models would be appropriate for different types of public 
appointment. For example, the importance of independent appointments 
may be greater for those bodies which have quasi-judicial powers (e.g. 
Ombudsman), in order to preserve the separation of powers between the 
executive from the judiciary.74 
                                                          
74
 TASC is currently engaged in further research on a typology of public appointments to investigate this 
option. 
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76. An important argument advanced to justify ministerial control over public 
appointments is that, the greater the autonomy of the agency from 
government, the greater the risk of ‘mission creep’.  It is however possible to 
address this concern while adhering to the principle of an independent 
system of public appointments. For example, in the case of commercial State 
bodies it may be desirable that the chair and vice chair be appointed by the 
Minister subject to endorsement by an appropriate parliamentary committee 
(e.g. Finance and Public Services), with all other members of the board to be 
appointed by the independent system, perhaps involving the chair in the 
selection process. 
77. First, it is essential that - as part of the development of a coherent framework 
for governance of all public bodies - an independent board should be 
retained only where this is clearly required in the public interest. In all other 
cases, accountability should be provided for through the structures of the 
relevant civil service department, and thus directly subject to the policy 
control of the Minister of the day. Second, in those limited cases where it is 
appropriate to appoint an independent board in a policy-sensitive area, a 
modification of Model C could be adopted. For example, selection criteria 
could include sensitivity to, and agreement with, the policy programme of 
government in the particular area, while the Cabinet could retain the right of 
final sign-off on the appointment from a list of suitably qualified nominees. In 
the UK system, ministers are involved in drawing up the appointment plan, 
including the criteria for appointment to a board. Along with their senior 
officials, they can suggest candidates who should be invited to apply. They 
are then kept appraised of the process, and choose from a final shortlist of 
two or three recommended candidates. They retain the power to veto any 
proposed candidate. While we argue that applying this process to all 
appointments diminishes the objective of achieving an independent system, 
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there is a case for applying some or all of the elements of this process in 
exceptional situations. 
78. In order to progress reform in this area, there is a pragmatic argument for 
adopting a phased approach – beginning with important commercial semi-
state bodies and gradually introducing a consistent system of public 
appointments to other bodies, task forces, and so on over a reasonable 
timeframe. 
79. The Programme for Government indicates a willingness to engage in some 
degree of reform in the area of public appointments, although there is no 
indication that a fully independent appointments system is planned. 
80. TASC estimates that there are over 600 public bodies and boards/committees 
of various types operating nationwide, as well as other bodies operating on a 
local or regional basis. The governance of our public bodies is thus crucial to 
the implementation of public policy across a variety of areas ranging from 
education, health and immigration, to food safety, public enterprise and road 
safety. Despite playing such a critical role, many of our public bodies are 
governed by boards of directors appointed in an ad hoc manner. Lack of 
transparency has given rise to persistent suggestions of cronyism and 
patronage. Serious consideration should therefore be given to a full range of 
options, including the creation of a fully independent appointments system. 
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